Decentralisation is frequently justified in terms of representation and participation, its advocates emphasising the capacity of regional institutions to remedy the democratic deficiencies of the centre. Yet empirical examinations of the democratic performance of regional governing systems are scarce; and there is no analysis that systematically compares the operation of different tiers within the same state. This article responds to this significant lacuna. Drawing upon the tools of cross-national comparison, it develops an analytical framework that evaluates the effects of regional and national institutions on the dispersal of electoral payoffs. This is applied to the United Kingdom, to compare the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales with Westminster. Through this analysis, the article provides important empirical insights regarding the difference wrought by decentralisation; and in turn, contributes to a burgeoning body of literature that offers a more critical assessment of the relationship between decentralisation and such democratic goods. Diamond, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2010; Lijphart, 2012) . There is, however, no a priori reason to assume that decentralisation will foster a closer connection between voters and legislators; and the extent to which regional governing systems are more remains a matter for empirical investigation. Yet, in contrast to the considerable attention devoted to national (notably Lijphart, 2012), analyses of the institutional inputs of
regional systems of government are scarce. Indeed, despite the fact that decentralisation is often justified in terms of addressing the perceived deficiencies of central government, there exists no comparative analyses of different tiers of government within the same state. This matters as d ot simply a phenomenon havi D V , 2000: 195) , and promises that regional governance will revitalise democracy risk raising expectations that may not be fulfilled.
This article directly addresses this lacuna, and draws upon Powell Elections as Instruments of
Democracy (2000) to develop an analytical framework that compares regional and national government in terms of the dispersal of electoral payoffs. In particular, and i B 168), this framework distinguishes between office payoffs and policy payoffs to examine the institutional opportunities that exist for both executive and non-executive legislators to affect the policy process. This framework is applied to the United Kingdom (UK) to compare the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales (NAW) and
Westminster. The case of the UK merits scholarly attention, and offers an important opportunity to context and rules [of] an existing (Bohrer and Krutz, 2005: 654-5) . The transfer of governing competencies via the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998 constituted an important watershed in UK majoritarian tradition, and was explicitly justified by the then Labour Government in terms of addressing the democratic deficits of Westminster majoritarianism (e.g. Cm. 3658, 1997; Cm. 3718, 1997) . H devolution was forged in the shadow of Westminster; and the existence of different modes of democracy across the UK has instead resulted in uneasy asymmetry and -constitutionality (Flinders, 2005; Matthews and Flinders, 2017) , the implications of which continue to unfold.
Through its analysis, this article makes a number of important contributions. Empirically, it provides critical insights regarding the difference wrought by regional government in terms of representation and the dispersal of electoral spoils; and by broadly controlling for factors such as political culture and governing norms, the single-country research design captures the effects of institutional variables such as electoral rules and committee systems (see Snyder, 2001 ). Theoretically, it contributes to a burgeoning body of literature that promotes a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between decentralisation and democratic goods (for example De Vries, 2000; Fatke, 2016; Spina, 2004) ; and dovetails with an important strand of work that examines whether institutional structures - (Carey and Hix, 2011 ; see also Kaiser et al, 2002; Aarts and Thomassen, 2008) . Methodologically, it develops an analytical framework that can be applied to different sites of government simultaneously, moving (Jeffery, 2008; Jeffery and Wincott, 2010 ) that has hitherto predominated. To develop these strands, the article proceeds as follows. In the next section, it elaborates briefly on the relationship between decentralisation, representation and institutional design; and discusses the necessity of establishing these connections through inter-region and intrastate analysis. Following on from this, the analytical framework is established. The framework is then applied to the UK, and the empirical results presented and evaluated. The article concludes by locating these findings within a series of theoretical debates regarding the relationship between political preferences and party competition; and methodological debates regarding the value of a "nyder, 2001: 100).
Decentralisation, representation and institutional design
In their seminal work, (Blau, 2008: 170-2) and the influence that different groups of legislators may have. In particular, equating influence with office-holding overlooks the other institutional channels through which non-government parliamentarians can achieve policy goals, as 'opposition parties may be able to exert deliberative policy influence, particularly through efforts in the legislative a (Strøm, 1990: 38-41) . Thirdly, and flowing out of this, a sole focus on office-holding does not capture the extent to which supporters of non-government parties are connected to the policy process via the ballot box. As P functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people. (facing minority government and the presence of strong legislative committees) (Powell, 2000: 103-9) . To ensure the validity of these weights, Powell triangulates his schema with several other key studies that explore the significance attached to various aspects of legislative influence (e.g. Laver and Hunt, 1992; Strøm, 1990) . O vote, the qualified support for all government and non-government parties can be aggregated to
The final stage of Powel framework evaluates a polity overall correspondence with the majoritarian and proportional visions of democracy (Powell, 2000: 136-42) . The majoritarianism vision anticipates that the largest party proportional vision requires a close correlation between popular support and the dispersal of authority (Powell, 2000: 137).
*** Figure 1 here*** To some extent, P the majoritarian and consensus democra L 2012). Yet whereas Lijphart focuses on the underlying norms of constitutional design (and, indeed, is animated by a stated preference for consensus), Powell focuses on the institutional pathways to achieving such principles. As such, to institutional engineering (Achen et al, 2011: 862; see also Taagpera, 2003: 2) . Indeed, P framework has been utilised by comparative scholars working in a range of national-level contexts (for example Costello, et al 2012; Mair and Thomassen, 2010 approximation of government and opposition legislative B , 2008: 173). Nonetheless, P between office and policy payoffs, several indicators do not travel to the regional level. In common with other comparative studies (for example Mattson and Strøm, 1995) , Powell associates committee strength committee to modify legislation, perhaps even introduce l 2000: 33). However existing scholarship makes clear that legislative scrutiny is just one of several functions of a committee system (see Benton and Russell, 2013; Kaiser, 2008) ; and in the context of decentralisation, where regional governments enjoy varying degrees of self-rule (Elazar, 1991) , such a narrow focus risks neglecting or misrepresenting the multi-dimensionality of their influence. Secondly, Powell suggests that a strong committee system has over ten standing committees corresponding to government departments (2000: 35) . Yet in the context of decentralisation, this threshold is arbitrary, as there is significant variation in the number of policy areas for which regional government is responsible (see Hooghe et al., 2010) ; and whilst this variation offers an important insight into the degree of self-rule enjoyed by a region, the strength of a committee system lies in the extent to which there is a clear responsibilities.
To overcome these limitations, this article draws on the work of scholars such as Kaiser (2008) and Benton and Russell (2013) to replace P categories of with the following additive criteria (see figure 1 above). The first element is simply the presence of legislative committees, as even a minimal or weak committee system provides a platform for some degree of opposition influence. Nonetheless, ad hoc or irregular committees will suffer from structural limitations, and the second element awards a score for a systematic committee structure that corresponds with the functions of the executive. Attention then turns to committee composition.
Whilst the distribution of chairs is an important indicator of the balance between government and opposition, focusing on chairs alone does not capture the membership. The proportionality of membership matters, so the third element focuses on the distribution of chairs and H edbe limited if those on a committee owe their positions to party patronage; and the fourth element awards a score for the existence of independent selection procedures. Finally, the powers of legislative committees should be risk being ineffective. The fifth element accordingly awards a score for the existence of clearly defined and commonly accepted responsibilities. Each element receives a score of 0.05. The minimum score a committee system can receive is zero (i.e. that the legislature does not have a committee system), and the maximum score is 0.25. This corresponds with the maximum score proposed (and validated) by Powell, and therefore preserves the balance between the two aspects of opposition influence. The next section puts this into effect. , 2000: 34) . Yet despite such optimism, a question mark hangs over the extent to which the devolved systems of government were calibrated to realise such ideals W systems in both regions did represent a departure from Westminster tradition, devolution was enacted within a framework that was designed by the centre and imbued with a number of majoritarian assumptions regarding the role of government and the division of legislature-executive relationships (Arter, 2004; Cairney and Wildfeldt, 2015; McAllister and Stirbu, 2007; Mitchell, 2000) .
Proportional and effective representation across the United Kingdom
By applying the analytical framework developed above, the remainder of this section will therefore systematically ascertain the extent to which the institutional architecture of devolution has promoted an alternative
The proportionality of electoral outcomes and the dispersal of office payoffs
A series of measures are applied to gauge the proportionality of election outcomes across the three polities (see table 1, online). In many respects, Westminster (Mitchell, 2000) of adversarial majoritarianism is reinforced. Single-party governments predominate despite lacking the support of a majority of voters (the Coalition of 2010-15 being the exception on both counts), which suggests W -majoritarian sphere of pluralitarian (Nagel, 2000: 118) . Nonetheless, whilst the confidence-and-supply arrangement between the Conservatives and the Democratic Unionist Party has afforded the latter greater policy leverage, the Prime Minister immediately ruled out a formal power-sharing coalition; and her determination to govern as a minority can be regarded as evidence of the enduring influence of the norms of majoritarianism.
The transfer of competencies to the Scottish Parliament and NAW in 1999 constituted a critical juncture in terms of the scope and depth of self-rule. 1 Yet, the extent to which the structures of regional government support the democratic (Mitchell, 2000) is less clear. In each region, a multi-party system has developed, with elections being fought along the centreperiphery cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) , reflecting the relative electoral strength of nonstatewide parties at the regional level (see Brancati, 2008) . Moreover, the additional member system has ensured a closer congruence between party competition and the dispersal of seats within each legislature, which is further reiterated by the significantly lower scores that each region receives on G ndex of disproportionality. Nonetheless, a more proportional electoral system has not (Palmer, 2011: 277 
Qualifying the conditions for opposition influence
However, to fully capture the extent that institutional structures connect the electorate with the policy process, it is also necessary to account for the extent to which each governing system provides opportunities for opposition legislators to achieve policy payoffs. Each polity is scored according to two aspects of opposition influence detailed above (see table, Conservatives to pass its four annual budgets, which was given in exchange for concessions on issues including business rates and town centre redevelopment.
In terms of the second aspect, the scores in table 2 W provides a relatively important vehicle for opposition influence. A formal system of select committees corresponding to ministerial departments was introduced in 1979, and was later praised for show [ing] the House of Commons at its best with constructive co-operation rather than routine disagreement (HC 300, 2000: 5) . Nonetheless, the lack of esteem attached to the task of oversight and the lack of clearly defined committee responsibilities was seen to undermine their impact (HC 300, 2000: 6). In response, several reforms relating to the resources enjoyed by select committees have been enacted.
Recognising the of ministerial office, the Liaison Committee recommended that In contrast, the structures of " P committee system have remained constant.
Compared to the NAW, the Scottish Parliament was subject to less central constraint and the Scotland Act 1998 simply required its standing orders to provide for a committee system with politicallybalanced membership. The P standing orders specify a number of mandatory committees and allow Parliament to establish any " P , 1999:
6.1). Yet whilst the standing orders enshrine a series of committee functions (6.2), subject committees are not obliged to correspond with ministerial portfolios. This has led to great variation in the extent to which committees map onto the functions of the executive. Some provide direct scrutiny of a specific portfolio, others span two or three, and some are thematic. In terms of committee membership, the standing orders invest authority in the Parliamentary Bureau to determine both the general membership T B balance of poli P (6.3), with similar rules governing chair appointments (12.1). However, whilst Parliament must approve the membership proposed by the Bureau, there are few opportunities for parliamentarians to directly influence selection. Moreover, committee chairs are elected by a committee from within its ranks, which means that there is no opportunity for any other individual to put themselves forward (12.1).
Effective representation and the potential for policy payoffs
Having delineated the institutional opportunities for opposition influence, it is now possible to calculate the total conditions for effective representation within each polity, 2 and in turn determine the extent to which its institutions connect the electorate with policymaking. Whilst few governments have enjoyed majority support, figure 2 reveals that the institutional structures of all three polities have provided sufficient opportunities for a majority of voters to be effectively represented.
Moreover, the average scores span a range of just 5.7, running from 56.4 at Westminster to 62.1 in Scotland, which tempers W . *** Figure 2 here*** Although these averages are broadly similar, significant variation exists in dispersal of opportunities for opposition influence. At Westminster, the most important aspect is the legislative committee structure, which has been critical in providing partial redress to the disproportionality of office payoffs.
Indeed, the way that governments have responded to demands for reform runs counter to (Mattson and Strøm, 1995: 253) . These results therefore challenge existing comparative analyses that cast select committees P , 2000: 106) a M and Strøm, 1995: 260) ; and in doing so moderates W negative rather than constructive A , 2013: 99) in which non-government actors are wholly excluded from policymaking. In Scotland and Wales, the greatest contribution to the total conditions for effective representation comes from opportunities for opposition bargaining .
In both regions, the highest scores achieved are in instances of minority government, which have 
Correspondence with democratic norms
Powell does not offer a benchmark to assess the quality of effective representation, although he does suggest that scores for total conditions for effective representation the P , 2000: 111). With average scores ranging from 56.4 to 62.1, it is evident whilst the institutional conditions in each polity have connected a majority of voters with the policy process, a significant minority remains excluded. Indeed, in all three polities the plurality average government share (i.e. office payoff) and policymaker share (i.e. policy payoff) has significantly exceed their share of the popular vote, whereas all runners-up have been consistently under-rewarded on both counts. The extent to which this is a cause for concern depends on the criteria adopted, that is, whether a polity is being judged against the standards of majoritarianism or proportionality. As detailed above, majoritarianism assumes that the plurality winner should enjoy full control of government and policymaking, whereas proportionality demands a close correlation between popular support and the dispersal of electoral payoffs (Powell, 2000: 137) . Accordingly, figures 3a and 3b below compare the dispersal of government shares and policymaker shares against the standards of majoritarianism and proportionality. 4 In terms of government shares, figure 3a shows 
Concluding comments and future research
Despite the normative claims of its proponents, there is no a priori reason to assume that decentralisation forges a closer connection between voters and legislators. In recognition, this article has examined the institutional inputs (i.e. electoral rules and legislative committee systems) that structure these connections, focusing on the national and regional systems of UK government. It has revealed a broadly similar pattern of electoral payoffs across the three polities, whereby the majoritarian allocation of the spoils of office has been partially offset by institutional opportunities for opposition parties to secure policy payoffs; and that the aggregation of institutional inputs in each polity has provided the conditions to connect a majority of voters with the policy process. In doing so, it has demonstrated that dichotomous contrasts between the elite, adversarial majoritarianism of Westminster and the more inclusive, consensual exercise of power within the devolved parliaments are exaggerated. At the same time, it has isolated the effects of specific institutional structures on the dispersal of payoffs, which underlines the potential of a multi-dimensional reform agenda for improving proportionality (i.e. electoral reform) and enhancing the conditions for opposition influence article by applying it to a wider range of cases, which would provide valuable comparative information and would facilitate intra-and inter-polity benchmarking. T P framework have also allowed for a political analysis better attuned to the multi-dimensionality of the institutional dynamics of opposition politics (see Kaiser, 2008 (Norris, 2011) , the potential for institutional engineering to improve the representativeness and inclusivity of policymaking is therefore an attractive strategy, albeit one that (Judge, 1993) on the part of those holding the levers of reform.
Yet, in terms of the extent to which regional government fosters a closer connection between voters and legislators regional democracy make -Steffen, 2013: 88) . Whilst this article has (i.e. the input legitimacy of a system of government) legitimacy of policy decisions taken). This important research agenda is beginning to receive attention (for example Cairney et al., 2016) , but further research is required to systematically explore whether policy outputs are more reflective of popular preferences at the national or regional level. To develop this agenda fully, future research will need to isolate the policy preferences of a given electorate by focusing the alignment between parties and voters, and the extent to which regional systems of government encourage greater responsiveness in terms of the median voter and the diversity of party competition. In turn, future research should also seek to capture the extent to which -level, and whether there is variance in voting behaviour in elections to central and regional government. This would dovetail with extant scholarship that has identified the co-existence of multiple systems of party competition across the UK (for example, Lynch, 2007; Quinn, 2012) , and would yield important insights regarding the that regional government provides opportunities for voters to express a different policy preferences. However, whilst there are several data sources pertaining to national-level politics such as Eurobarometer, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and the Comparative Manifesto Project there remains a dearth of comparable information for other tiers of government. Whilst nascent steps in this direction have been taken (see, for example, Bäck et al., 2013; Pogorelis et al., 2005) , the emphasis has been upon and policy outputs, rather than the alignment between party platforms and the policy preferences of the electorate. In order to address this, the accrual of data relating to the policy preferences of voters in regional elections is vital. As Jeffery and Table 4 , available online, details in full dataset for the overall electoral responsiveness according to majoritarian and proportional norms, 1997-2017. 5 The simulation is achieved by calculating the ratio between the average percentage of votes and the average percentage of seats for the plurality winner, 2 nd , 3 rd , and 4 th + parties under one set of electoral rules, and applying this to the outcomes of the elections in another domain. It does not simulate the vote basis of government, as this is a matter of political negotiation rather than an automatic product of electoral rules. 
